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Corruption in Emerging Countries:
A Matter of Isomorphism
7KLVSDSHUEDVHGRQQHRLQVWLWXWLRQDO OLWHUDWXUH IRFXVHVRQ WKH LQÁXHQFHRI
organizational isomorphism on corruption in emerging countries. A question-
QDLUHZDVDGPLQLVWHUHGLQIDFHWRIDFHLQWHUYLHZVZLWKWRSH[HFXWLYHVLQÀUPV
DFURVVYDULRXVHFRQRPLFVHFWRUVLQHPHUJLQJFRXQWULHV2XUÀQGLQJVOHDGXV
WRFRQFOXGHWKDWFRUUXSWLRQLVLQÁXHQFHGE\FRHUFLYHPLPHWLFDQGFRPSHWLWLYH
isomorphism. This study indicates that the higher the quality of a given insti-
tutional framework, the lower the level of corrupt behaviour. Furthermore, we 
suggest that corruption is explained by mimetism within the same economic 
VHFWRU:HWKXVFRQFOXGHWKDWDÀUPLVPRUHOLNHO\WRUHVRUWWRFRUUXSWLRQLILWV
competitors already adopt corrupt behaviour.
INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is often characterized as one of the single greatest obsta-
cles to economic and social development (World Bank, 2000; United 
Nations, 2002, 2008; Aguilera & Adera, 2008). Despite its negative im-
pact, corruption has spread worldwide for diverse reasons including 
the low salaries earned by civil servants, the availability of economic 
rents from which bribes may be extracted and/or the under-develop-
ment of legal systems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 
1999).  A key reason for the survival of corruption is the weakness of in-
stitutional frameworks. Indeed, the higher the quality of an institutional 
framework, the lower the chances of corruption (World Bank, 1997, 
2000). Social, cultural, economic and political institutions undoubtedly 
LQÁXHQFHVRFLHWLHVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQV6FRWWDQGWKHVHLQ-
stitutional forces may explain why organizations have become increas-
ingly similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) and 
pursue similar actions including corrupt behaviour. 
0DQ\DXWKRUVDJUHHRQ WKH IROORZLQJGHÀQLWLRQRI FRUUXSWLRQ ´a ma-
nipulation of powers of government or sale of government property, or 
ERWKE\JRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVIRUSHUVRQDOXVH” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; 
-DLQ7KLVGHÀQLWLRQLVTXLWHVLPLODUWRWKDWJLYHQE\0RUULV“ a 
EHKDYLRXUE\DSXEOLFRIÀFLDOWKDWGHYLDWHVIURPSXEOLFLQWHUHVWµ (1991) 
RUWKHGHÀQLWLRQIURPWKH:RUOG%DQNDOHDGLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOERG\WKDW
VWXGLHVWKHLVVXHDQGZKLFKGHÀQHVFRUUXSWLRQDV´the abuse of public 
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RIÀFHIRUSULYDWHJDLQ” (World Bank, 1997: 8). Thus, corruption is usual-
O\GHÀQHGDVWKHPLVXVHRISXEOLFSRZHUIRUSULYDWHEHQHÀW/DPEVGRUII
2007). We need to be careful, however, for there is a certain degree of 
GLVFRUGZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHGHÀQLWLRQ6RPHUHVHDUFKHUV IRUH[DPSOH
KDYHVWXGLHGFRUUXSWLRQEHWZHHQSULYDWHÀUPVQRWFRUUXSWLRQLQYROYLQJ
SXEOLFRIÀFHEXWWKLVLVQRWRXUIRFXV2WKHUUHVHDUFKHUVKDYHWDNHQ
a wider stance in their perspective of corruption (Ashforth, Gioia, Rob-
LQVRQ	7UDYLQR ,QVWHDGRI´DEXVHRISULYDWHRIÀFH” as in the 
:RUOG%DQNGHÀQLWLRQWKH\VXEVWLWXWHWKHZRUG´authority” (Rodriguez, 
Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006) thereby including various types of cor-
ruption. In this paper, we have adopted the more limited, but relatively 
FRPPRQGHÀQLWLRQRIFRUUXSWLRQ6KOHLIHU	9LVKQ\-DLQ
5HO\LQJRQQHRLQVWLWXWLRQDO OLWHUDWXUHWKLVSDSHUIRFXVHVRQWKHLQÁX-
ence of organizational isomorphism on corruption in emerging coun-
tries. Our aim is to examine the institutional reasons for corruption 
using a model based on empirical research in emerging countries. A 
TXHVWLRQQDLUHZDVDGPLQLVWUDWHGLQSHUVRQWRWRSH[HFXWLYHVIURPÀUPV
across various economic sectors in emerging countries. 
The paper is motivated by the social and economic importance of cor-
ruption. Corruption is a major ethical social issue for any country. Fur-
thermore, since studies have correlated an increase in corruption with 
HFRQRPLFGHFOLQH 0DXUR5RVH$FNHUPDQ WKH WRSLF LV
also economically relevant. The paper includes various research con-
tributions. Firstly, the study is based on direct data collection, which is 
currently lacking in research on corruption. This is understandable in 
view of the hidden nature of the phenomenon. Most research on cor-
UXSWLRQ UHOLHVRQPDFURHFRQRPLFGDWDVSHFLÀFDOO\EDVHGRQDEURDG
evaluation of the issue by organizations such as Transparency Interna-
tional. This paper is based on a large-scale empirical survey conducted 
in 26 emerging countries. Another added-value of this paper is our use 
of the organisational isomorphism model to study corruption. In par-
WLFXODUZHGHYHORSHGWKHK\SRWKHVLVWKDWFRUUXSWLRQE\DQ\ÀUPLVLQÁX-
enced by the magnitude of unfair behaviour adopted by its competitors. 
$PDMRUFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKLVSDSHULVRXUÀQGLQJWKDWFRUUXSWLRQLVODUJHO\
H[SODLQHGE\WKHPLPHWLVPRISHHUV3UDFWLFDOO\VSHDNLQJDÀUPPD\
decide to use corruption when its competitors adopt unfair behaviour. 
We also explain corruption by coercive and competitive isomorphism.
7KHÀUVWVHFWLRQRIWKHSDSHULVDOLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZFRQFHUQLQJ
corruption and organizational isomorphism in the context of emerging 
FRXQWULHV7KHPDLQÀQGLQJVIURPWKHWKHRUHWLFDO OLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZOHG
us to empirical research building. The second section addresses the 
empirical research conducted and the methods adopted. The paper 
progresses to an examination of the empirical results, including a de-
scription of the results of the structural equation model. This analysis 
leads to our conclusion. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
)RUPDQ\\HDUVVFKRODUVKDYHEHHQZRUNLQJ LQYDULRXVÀHOGVRIVR-
cial science to connect institutions with the structure and behaviour 
of organizations. The new institutionalism has tried to provide fresh 
answers to old questions about how social choices are shaped, medi-
ated, and channeled by institutional arrangements (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991). In this perspective, some key work was conducted by DiMaggio 
and Powell who introduced the idea of organizational isomorphism to 
XQGHUVWDQGVLPLODULWLHVLQÀUPV,VRPRUSKLVPLVD´constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
IDFHWKHVDPHVHWRIHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQGLWLRQVµ
The process of isomorphism concerns various types of behaviours, 
including corruption. The study of organizational isomorphism is a key 
to understanding an organizational decision to adopt corrupt practices. 
Hence, in the next section, we discuss the various types of isomor-
phism which underpin our diverse hypotheses.
Competitive isomorphism is the pressure to adopt behaviour similar to 
that of the competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979). The 
link between competition and corruption has been studied by various 
authors including Goldsmith (1999) who argued that corruption is neg-
atively correlated with different indicators of economic freedom. How-
ever, Ades and DiTella stated that, in theory, the effect of competition 
on corruption is ambiguous (1999). Lambsdorff (2007) also argued that 
economic liberalization does not immediately reduce corruption. Using 
the number of years a country has been open to trade as a proxy for 
competition, Sachs and Warner showed that, in many cases, economic 
reform paid off after a few years in terms of accelerated growth of GDP 
7KHLUUHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHLQFUHDVHLQFRPSHWLWLRQPD\
not reduce corruption immediately. Other empirical results show that 
the number of years of open trade (proxy for competition) is nega-
tively correlated to corruption (Leite & Weidemann, 1999; Treisman, 
7KHUHIRUHWKHÀUVWHIIHFWRIFRPSHWLWLRQPD\EHDQLQFUHDVHLQ
corruption (Tavares, 2007; Venard, 2008). For example, an executive 
may have been given high-level targets by his/her hierarchy, and when 
confronted with intense competition, he or she may use corruption to 
achieve the required results (Clinard, 1983). Many emerging countries 
KDYHEHHQFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\ODFNRIFRPSHWLWLRQ7KHUHIRUHLQWKHÀUVW
VWDJHRIHFRQRPLFOLEHUDOL]DWLRQSURFHVVHVÀUPVLQHPHUJLQJFRXQWULHV
PD\WU\WRVHFXUHUHQWVIURPRUZLWKFRUUXSWJRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOV
In its second phase, increased competition will lead to a decline in 
corruption. Given the scope of the research concerning emerging 
FRXQWULHVQHZWRFRPSHWLWLRQ6DFKV	:DUQHUWKHFRPSHWLWLYH
LVRPRUSKLVPSHUVSHFWLYH OHDGVWRRXUÀUVWK\SRWKHVLVH1: ‘A positive 
UHODWLRQVKLSH[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHLQWHQVLW\RIFRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQÀUPV
and the level of corruption.’
M@n@gement, vol. 12, no. 1, 2009. 1-27
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,QVWLWXWLRQDO LVRPRUSKLVP LV WKH VLPLODULW\ DPRQJ ÀUPV UHVXOWLQJ IURP
the institutional environment. The institutional environment is the set 
of key external institutions that constrain any organization to adopt an 
organizational form. Hawley proposed the principle of isomorphism, in 
ZKLFKWKHVLPLODULW\EHWZHHQRUJDQL]DWLRQVUHÁHFWVWKHVLPLODULW\RIWKHLU
HQYLURQPHQWVDQGYDULDWLRQ LQRUJDQL]DWLRQDO IRUPVUHÁHFWV WKHGLYHU-
VLW\RIHQYLURQPHQWV7KHNH\ LVVXH LV WRGHWHUPLQHWKH
fundamental mechanisms through which isomorphic change occurs. 
'L0DJJLRDQG3RZHOOLGHQWLÀHGWKUHHPHFKDQLVPVFRHUFLYHPLPHWLF
and normative (1983, 1991). 
Coercive isomorphism is the homogenization of organizations caused 
by the pressure exercised on a given organization by other organiza-
WLRQV$QH[DPSOHRIDSRZHUIXORUJDQL]DWLRQLVWKHVWDWH6FRWW
VLQFHÀUPVDUHLQÁXHQFHGE\UXOHVLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGDQGOHJLWLPL]HGE\
WKHVWDWH0H\HU	5RZDQ7KHVWDWHGHÀQHVLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPH-
ZRUNVWKDWLQÁXHQFHRUJDQL]DWLRQVE\HVWDEOLVKLQJUXOHVLQVSHFWLQJWKH
FRQIRUPLW\RI ÀUPVDQGKDQGLQJRXW UHZDUGVRUSXQLVKPHQWV 6FRWW

Figure 1.+\SRWKHVL]HGPRGHOH[SODLQLQJWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQLQÀUPVLQHPHUJLQJFRXQWULHV
M@n@gement, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2009. 1-27
6
Corruption in Emerging Countries: A Matter of Isomorphism
Many scholars and international agencies have noted an institutional 
impact on corruption. Studies have shown that it is necessary to build 
appropriate regulative institutions to reduce corruption (World Bank, 
1997, 2000). For example, based on empirical research, Dreher, Kotso-
giannis and McCorriston showed that the higher the institutional qual-
LW\WKHORZHUWKHXVHRIFRUUXSWLRQ7KHUHIRUHWRÀJKWFRUUXSWLRQ
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
World Bank, the United Nations, and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposed improving the qual-
ity of institutional frameworks. 
7KHTXHVWLRQ LV WKHUHIRUH WRGHÀQH WKHTXDOLW\ RI DJLYHQ LQVWLWXWLRQ-
DO IUDPHZRUN ,QWKLVSDSHUZHGHÀQHWKHVWUHQJWKRIDQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
framework through the strength of variables, including the quality of the 
legal framework, the quality of law enforcement, and the quality of the 
ÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVHDFKYDULDEOHLVFODULÀHGVHSDUDWHO\KHUHDIWHU
Firstly, the legal framework is an important variable in the analysis of 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHPV6FRWW$VVWDWHGE\'L0DJJLRDQG3RZHOO
´WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDFRPPRQOHJDOHQYLURQPHQWDIIHFWVPDQ\DVSHFWV
RIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQҋVEHKDYLRXUDQGVWUXFWXUHµ2QHH[DPSOHRI
regulation is the “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
2IÀFLDOVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV7UDQVDFWLRQVµ promulgated in 1997 
(OECD, 2007). The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires countries 
WR LPSRVH WRXJK VDQFWLRQV² LQFOXGLQJ ÀQHVDQG LPSULVRQPHQW ² IRU
EULEHU\RIIRUHLJQSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVDOVRUHIHUUHGWRDV´IRUHLJQEULEHU\µ
The laws are norms that are drawn up to guide the actions of all eco-
QRPLF DFWRUV ZLWKLQ DQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO IUDPHZRUN /DZV WKDW GHÀQH WKH
forbidden, such as corruption, and also constrain these behaviours 
with negative incentives (such as punishments) are set out to deter 
non-appropriate action. Laws are crucial not only for the protection of 
FRQWUDFWVDQGSULYDWHSURSHUW\EXWDOVRWROLPLWWKHDELOLW\RIRIÀFLDOVWR
prey on private property and solicit bribes. A strong legal environment 
LVJUHDWO\QHHGHGE\HPHUJLQJFRXQWULHVWRÀJKWFRUUXSWLRQ5RGULJXH]
& Ehrichs, 2007). In a study of 61 countries, Kimbro noted the impact of 
the quality of legal systems on corruption (2002). Thus, governments 
VHHNLQJWRÀJKWFRUUXSWLRQQHHGWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHODZVWKDWSXQLVKFRU-
ruption (Rodriguez et al. 2007). 
Secondly, while laws are important, they are useless without enforce-
PHQW1RUWKHPSKDVL]HGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIHIÀFLHQWOHJDOV\V-
tems to enforce contracts, a determinant for economic growth. Thus, 
the ability of governments to enforce laws is crucial in assessing the 
TXDOLW\RIDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWHVSHFLDOO\LQLWVDELOLW\WRLQÁX-
ence corruption. The legal framework not only refers to laws but also 
includes the creation of regulatory institutions that monitor competi-
tion, securities markets, banking, trade, patents and other economic 
sectors that require business law enforcement (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1998). To explain the effect of law enforcement on corruption, we 
should consider the scenario in which a country has enacted anti-
corruption regulations, but lacks complete application of these laws. 
,QVXFKFDVHV WKH ODZVDUH UHQGHUHGXVHOHVV LQÀJKWLQJFRUUXSWLRQ
Thus, experts recommend that to ensure anti-corruption laws are ef-
M@n@gement, vol. 12, no. 1, 2009. 1-27
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fectively enforced, the enforcement process must be monitored (Rodri-
guez et al., 2007: 310). Various strategies to reduce corruption are thus 
connected, such as anti-corruption laws which must incorporate strong 
law enforcement policies (Pope, 2000).
7KLUGO\ WKH ÀQDQFLDO V\VWHP LV DOVR DQ LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW RI WKH LQVWL-
tutional environment (Zysman, 1983; Szego, 1993). Whitley (1999) 
suggested that the assessment of an institutional framework should be 
SDUWO\EDVHGRQDQHYDOXDWLRQRI WKHTXDOLW\RI WKHÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWV
Thus, it is possible to differentiate between various countries when ana-
O\VLQJWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHLUGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIÀQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
(Cox, 1986). Some studies have shown the link between the quality of 
WKHÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWDQGWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQFRQFOXGLQJWKDWORZLQ-
WHUQDWLRQDOÀQDQFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKDQHFRQRP\GRHV
QRWUHVWUDLQFURVVERUGHUÀQDQFLDOWUDQVDFWLRQVLVSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHG
to an increase in corruption (Edison et al., 2002). Rivera-Batiz also 
showed that countries with widespread corruption suffer from low rates 
RI UHWXUQ RQ FDSLWDO EHIRUH WKH OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ÀQDQFLDO
WUDQVDFWLRQV2IFRXUVHWKHTXDOLW\RIÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVGHSHQGV
RQ YDULRXV GLPHQVLRQV 7KH FULWLFDO FULWHULD IRU HYDOXDWLQJ D ÀQDQFLDO
market focus on the processes by which capital is more or less easily 
DYDLODEOH:KLWOH\9HQDUG	+DQDÀ,IFDSLWDOLVHDVLHU
WRSURFXUH LW LVDOVRHDVLHU IRUÀUPV WRÀQDQFH WKHLUDFWLYLWLHVDQGVR
investing in a new economic project such as product development or 
the creation of a foreign subsidiary will be easier to fund. In this paper, 
WKHTXDOLW\RIDJLYHQÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWLVWKXVDQHYDOXDWLRQRILWVYDULRXV
NH\FRPSRQHQWVZKLFKLPSOLHVWKDWFDSLWDOLVHDV\IRUÀUPVWRDFFHVV
In view of the preceding discussion, our hypothesis is that the higher 
the quality of the institutional environments (quality of law, law enforce-
PHQWDQGÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVWKHORZHUWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQ
Our hypothesis is therefore H2´A negative relationship exists between 
WKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWDQGWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQµ
)XUWKHUPRUHRXUGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW
leads to the following hypotheses:
 H2a ´$SRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSH[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHTXDOLW\RI WKH
legal framework and the quality of the institutional environment.”
 H2b´$SRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSH[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHTXDOLW\RI ODZ
enforcement and the quality of the institutional environment.”
 H2c ´$SRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSH[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHTXDOLW\RI WKH
ÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWDQGWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWµ
Another important mechanism of institutional isomorphism is mimetism. 
Mimetic isomorphism is often analyzed as a key factor of homogeni-
zation in the institutional literature (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Mimetism 
LVGHÀQHGDVFRS\LQJDFWLRQVRIEXVLQHVVSHHUV'L0DJJLR	3RZHOO
$ÀUPҋVGHFLVLRQWRDGRSWFRUUXSWEHKDYLRXUFRXOGWKHUHIRUHEH
OLQNHGWRLWVFRPSHWLWRUҋVEHKDYLRXU9HQDUG	+DQDÀ&RUUXSWLRQ
LVQRWRQO\DQLQGLYLGXDODFWLRQEXWLVDOVRDVRFLDODFWLRQLQÁXHQFHGE\
the behaviour of other social actors. Rose-Ackerman noted that mem-
bership to a reference group implies mimetism with regard to corruption 
7KHUHIHUHQFHJURXSIRUDQRUJDQL]DWLRQLVDJURXSRIÀUPVLQ
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the same market sector and a participant in the reference group might 
LPLWDWHWKHFRUUXSWEHKDYLRXURIWKHRWKHUPHPEHUV7KXVLIÀUPVLQDQ
economic sector adopt a large degree of unfair behaviour (not only cor-
UXSWEHKDYLRXUDVSHFLÀFHQWHUSULVHLQWKHVDPHVHFWRUZLOOFHUWDLQO\
imitate this behaviour and will use corruption as a means to achieve 
LWVÀQDQFLDOREMHFWLYHV:HGHÀQHXQIDLUEHKDYLRXULQWKLVSDSHUDVWKH
OLNHOLKRRGRIÀUPV WREHGLVKRQHVW$QÀUPXVLQJXQIDLUEHKDYLRXU LV
one that does not respect local regulations, such as paying govern-
ment taxes, or which fails to observe or follow trade regulation. If many 
ÀUPVZLWKLQWKHVDPHHFRQRPLFVHFWRUSUDFWLFHXQIDLUEHKDYLRXUWKH\
ZLOO KDYH D FRPSHWLWLYH DGYDQWDJH RYHU DQ\ JLYHQ ҊKRQHVWҋ ÀUP )RU
H[DPSOH IDLOXUH WRSD\ WD[HVZLOO UHGXFH WKH ҊXQIDLUҋ ÀUPҋV FRVWV7R
SUHVHUYHLWVHFRQRPLFUHQWVWKHUHDFWLRQRIWKHҊKRQHVWҋÀUPPD\EHWR
imitate the behaviour of its reference group. Our second hypothesis is 
therefore H3´A positive relationship exists between unfair behaviour 
E\FRPSHWLWRUVDQGWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQµ
Finally, the last institutional isomorphism concept is normative isomor-
SKLVP ZKLFK UHIHUV WR WKH IDFW WKDW RUJDQL]DWLRQV DUH LQÁXHQFHG E\
rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimen-
VLRQLQWRVRFLDOOLIH6FRWW6RFLHWDOQRUPVPD\EHLQWURGXFHG
in various ways. For example, March and Olsen noted that much of an 
RUJDQL]DWLRQҋVEHKDYLRXULVJRYHUQHGE\RUJDQL]DWLRQDOSURFHVVHVVXFK
as strategies, objectives, and conventions (1989). In this article, we will 
analyse a particular example of normative isomorphism in which norms 
were introduce by the headquarters of multinationals for its subsidiar-
ies. Thus, a local subsidiary of a multinational will face considerable 
SUHVVXUHWRUHVSHFWWKHYDULRXVQRUPVDGRSWHGE\WKHPXOWLQDWLRQDOҋV
headquarters. For example, the top management of a multinational 
could issue various recommendations and internal procedures, which 
EHFRPH LQWHUQDO QRUPV VKDUHG E\ WKH JURXSҋV YDULRXV HQWLWLHV 7KH
TXHVWLRQWKHQEHFRPHVZKDWLQÁXHQFHWKLVQRUPDWLYHLVRPRUSKLVPKDV
on the potential for corruption. It is recognized that developed coun-
tries have a much lower level of corruption than emerging countries 
0DXUR7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWHUQDWLRQDOKDVGRFXPHQWHGWKHORZHVW
levels of corruption in the richest countries (Rodriguez et al., 2007). 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKH2(&'´Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
3XEOLF 2IÀFLDOV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO %XVLQHVV7UDQVDFWLRQVµ recommends 
WKDWFRXQWULHVLPSRVHWRXJKVDQFWLRQV²LQFOXGLQJÀQHVDQGLPSULVRQ-
PHQW²RQWKHLUPXOWLQDWLRQDOVIRUEULEHU\RIIRUHLJQSXEOLFRIÀFLDOV0RVW
multinationals are headquartered in developed countries (this trend is 
changing but was not prevalent at the time of our survey). Therefore, 
we might expect that if multinationals in developed countries invest 
in enterprises within emerging countries, then the multinationals will 
extend their ethical norms to their subsidiaries and will seek to reduce 
corrupt practices. The importance of ethical norms transmitted by mul-
tinationals to their subsidiaries will be correlated with the importance 
RI WKHIRUHLJQÀQDQFLDOVWDNHZLWKLQ WKHFDSLWDORI WKHVXEVLGLDU\7KH
JUHDWHUWKHÀQDQFLDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHPXOWLQDWLRQDOLQLWVVXEVLGLDU\
the greater the normative isomorphism should be and thus, the lesser 
the chance of corruption in the subsidiary. Our next hypothesis H4 is 
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WKHUHIRUH´$QHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSH[LVWVEHWZHHQIRUHLJQÀQDQFLDOSDU-
WLFLSDWLRQLQORFDOÀUPVLQHPHUJLQJFRXQWULHVDQGWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQ
LQÀUPVµ
At macroeconomic level, government intervention is crucial in building 
appropriate business systems (Whitley, 1999). Key institutions need to 
be created via state intervention. The construction of a legal framework 
LVDVXIÀFLHQWH[DPSOHWRHPSKDVL]HWKHQHHGIRUVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQ,Q
the invisible hand model, the government restricts itself to providing 
public goods, such as regulations and law enforcement, and leaves 
most allocation decisions to the private sector (Frye & Shleifer, 1997). 
At microeconomic level, however, governments can be interventionist 
but also unorganized, and thus may have a larger number of bureau-
crats pursuing personal agendas, including taking bribes (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993). A number of authors have described the phenomena 
of the politicisation of economic activity (Johnson, Kaufman, & Zoido-
Lobaton, 1998).  Politicisation of an economic activity describes the ex-
HUFLVHRIFRQWUROULJKWVRYHUÀUPVE\SROLWLFLDQVDQGEXUHDXFUDWV-RKQ-
son et al., 1998). Government interventions designed to correct market 
failures require the use of different bureaucrats to make decisions, but 
also may create opportunities for politicians and civil servants to adopt 
FRUUXSWEHKDYLRXUDQGGHPDQGEULEHV$FHPRJOX	9HUGLHU
When politicians and civil servants have some residual control rights 
RYHUÀUPVWKH\PD\XVHWKLVSRZHUWRVHUYHWKHLUSULYDWHLQWHUHVWVDQG
ask for bribes. Practically speaking, when a politician has some power 
RYHUDSULYDWHÀUPKHVKHPD\XVHWKLVSRZHUWRGHYHORSFRUUXSWLRQWR
KLVKHUEHQHÀW)URPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIDSULYDWHÀUPLWVNH\H[HFX-
tives may feel that they lack the required state protection, and some 
politicians may use this lack of protection to gain power over the private 
ÀUP ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH H[HFXWLYHV PD\ GHYHORS FRUUXSW UHODWLRQV ZLWK
SXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWRSURWHFWWKHLUSURSHUW\6RQLQ7KXVWKHUHLVD
PDMRUGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQDJRYHUQPHQWҋVLQÁXHQFHLQLPSOHPHQWLQJD
ҊIULHQGO\ҋEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWQRWDEO\ZLWKDQDGHTXDWHOHJDOIUDPH-
work and law enforcement base) and the intervention of a government 
LQWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRISULYDWHÀUPV2QDPDFURHFRQRPLFOHYHOSROLWLFDO
intervention leads to the transformation of an institutional context. The 
government restricts itself to providing public goods (Frye & Shleifer, 
1997), and this leads to a decline in corruption. At microeconomic lev-
el, however, the government could interfere in the decisions of private 
ÀUPVFUHDWLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUFRUUXSWLRQ7KXVJRYHUQPHQWLQWHUYHQ-
WLRQLQWKHRSHUDWLRQVRISULYDWHÀUPVFRXOGOHDGWRDFHUWDLQDPRXQWRI
corruption (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000). Our last hypothesis is therefore: 
H5 ´In emerging countries, a positive relationship exists between the 
OHYHORISROLWLFLVDWLRQRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\DQGWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQµ
M@n@gement, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2009. 1-27
10
Corruption in Emerging Countries: A Matter of Isomorphism
METHODS
Sample 
To test our theoretical model, a method of direct data collection through 
face-to-face interviews was used. The sample was composed of 4104 
ÀUPVLQFRXQWULHV7KHVXUYH\ZDVFRQGXFWHGDVSDUWRIWKH(%5'
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and World 
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. The 
population of business organisations was studied in each country in 
RUGHUWRREWDLQDEUHDNGRZQRISULYDWHVHFWRUÀUPV7KLVZDVQHFHV-
sary in order to conduct the survey using a quota method. Table 1 
and 2 describe various elements of the sample. The sample was built 
via the quota method using three criteria: industry category, number 
RIHPSOR\HHVDQGORFDWLRQ7KHÀQDOVDPSOHZDVVLPLODUWRWKHWKUHH
FULWHULDRIWKHSRSXODWLRQRISULYDWHÀUPVLQWKHGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHV$F-
curate sampling of organisations was crucial in order to ensure that the 
UHVHDUFKÀQGLQJVZHUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
Data collection
,QWHUYLHZVZHUHFRQGXFWHGZLWKPDQDJHUVRURZQHUVRIÀUPVWKURXJK
site visits in 26 countries from June 1998 through to August 1998. Since 
our research focused on the link between organizational isomorphism 
and corruption, the period of time is not crucial. Our objective was to 
test theoretical hypotheses concerning corruption in various national 
contexts and not to describe corruption in emerging countries at the 
end of the 1990s. The respondents were 30% company owners, 17% 
FKLHIH[HFXWLYHRIÀFHUVFRPSDQ\SUHVLGHQWVGLUHFWRUVDQGÀ-
QDQFLDORIÀFHUVDFFRXQWDQWV7KHUHPDLQLQJKDGRWKHUPDQDJH-
rial positions. Different interviewers were used in the various countries. 
Table 1 gives the list of countries and the number of interviews per 
country. The diversity of the 26 countries allowed us to test our hypoth-
eses in various national contexts. A test questionnaire was adminis-
WHUHGYLDÀYHLQWHUYLHZVLQHDFKFRXQWU\$IWHUWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHVZHUH
completed, the companies were contacted by phone to ensure that the 
ÀUPPDWFKHGWKHUHOHYDQWTXRWDFULWHULDDQGWRDUUDQJHDQDSSRLQWPHQW
with the prospective respondent. Interviews were conducted face-to-
face using the specially designed questionnaire to assess the level of 
corruption. The questionnaire was translated into various languages. 
Most interviews lasted between one and two hours. The questionnaire 
ZDV GLYLGHG LQWR WZR SDUWV 7KH ÀUVW SDUW FRQFHUQHG WKH GHVFULSWLRQ
RI ERWK WKH ÀUP DQG WKH UHVSRQGHQW7KH VHFRQG SDUW FRQWDLQHG 
questions to assess various aspects of the business environment, the 
importance of corruption, and various elements concerning corruption 
experiences and practices (See Appendix 1 for the questionnaire). 
7KHLQWHUYLHZVZHUHFDUULHGRXWLQWKHUHVSRQGHQWVҋRIÀFHVE\WUDLQHG
interviewers. One in six interviews was audited by a phone call to the 
respondent to check that the interview was conducted properly. Some 
questions were repeated to ensure accuracy. 
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Table 1. List of countries involved in the empirical research and number of 
questionnaires per country. 
Country  Number of questionnaires     % of questionnaires
Albania   163  4
$UPHQLD     
Azerbaijan   137  3.3
Belarus   132  3.2
Bosnia   127  3.1
Bulgaria   130  3.2
Croatia   127  3.1
Czech Republic  149  3.6
Estonia   132  3.2
Georgia   129  3.1
Hungary   147  3.6
Kazakhstan  147  3.6
Kyrgyzstan   132  3.2
Latvia   166  4.0
Lithuania   112  2.7
Macedonia   136  3.3
Moldova   139  3.4
Poland   246  6.0
5HS6HUSVND    
5RPDQLD     
5XVVLD     
Slovakia   138  3.4
6ORYHQLD     
7XUNH\     
Ukraine   247  6.0
Uzbekistan   126  3.1
TOTAL   4104  100.0
Table 2. Description of the sample according to the sampling criteria. 
Description of the sample    Number of respondents      % of questionnaires
Capital city     1248  30
Other towns with over 1 million inhabitants  244  6
%HWZHHQDQGLQKDELWDQWV    
%HWZHHQDQGLQKDELWDQWV    
%HORZLQKDELWDQWV     
Total     4104  100% 
9HU\VPDOOÀUPVIHZHUWKDQHPSOR\HHV    
6PDOOÀUPV      
0HGLXPÀUPVHPSOR\HHV    
/DUJHÀUPVHPSOR\HHV     
Total     4104  100% 
$JULFXOWXUH)DUPLQJ)LVKLQJ)RUHVWU\    
0LQLQJ4XDUU\LQJ(QHUJ\     
Manufacturing    1249  30
Building, Construction    376  9
7UDGHZKROHVDOH      
5HWDLO       
Transport (air, land, sea)   240  6
Financial services    70  2
Personal services: health, welfare, education and others 230  6
Business services    249  6
Total     4104  100%
3ULYDWHFRPSDQLHV      
6WDWHRZQHGÀUPV      
Total     4104  100%
  
)LQDQFLDOVWDNHE\DIRUHLJQFRPSDQ\    
1RÀQDQFLDOVWDNHE\DIRUHLJQFRPSDQ\    
Total     4104  100%
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Measures
Partial Least Square (PLS) generates statistics to test the reliability and 
validity of constructs with two or more indicators. As shown in Table 3, 
WKHLQGH[HVKDGDWOHDVWD&URQEDFKҋVњDERYHZKLFKLVDERYHWKH
suggested reliability level of 0.70 indicated by the literature (Nunnally, 
1978). For all the variables (except the internationalization variable), an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted across all the various 
items (each item corresponded to a question). For all the variables, we 
KDGVXIÀFLHQWFRQYHUJHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDWLWZDVYDOLGWRLQFRUSRUDWHDOO
RIWKHLWHPVLQWRRQHPHDVXUH)RUHDFKYDULDEOHWKH()$LGHQWLÀHGRQO\
RQHGLPHQVLRQ5HOLDELOLW\ZDVDOVRHYDOXDWHGXVLQJWKH'LOORQ*ROGVWHLQҋV
rho. A rho superior to 0.6 indicates that the variance of a variable explains 
at least 60% of the variance of the corresponding measure (Fornell & 
Larker, 1981). As Table 3 shows, this was the case for all the variables in 
RXUPRGHO,QRUGHUWRDVVHVVWKHVFDOHVWUXFWXUHZHSHUIRUPHGDFRQÀU-
matory factor analysis on all the items related to the eight latent variables 
SUHYLRXVO\LGHQWLÀHGDQGYDOLGDWHGE\WKHH[SORUDWRU\IDFWRUDQDO\VHV$OO
in all, the analysis proved satisfactory, as the Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) was 0.068, a fairly good value with regards 
to the complexity of the analysis (eight latent variables and 60 measure-
PHQWYDULDEOHV,QDGGLWLRQDOOWKHORDGLQJVKDGVLJQLÀFDQWSDUDPHWHUHV-
WLPDWHVWWHVW!DQGWKH-RUHVNRJҋVUKRVZHUHDOODERYHWKHWKUHVK-
old, hence validating the overall structure of our scales. 
7KHGHSHQGHQWҊFRUUXSWLRQҋYDULDEOHZDVVSHFLÀHGLQOLQHZLWKRXUK\SRWK-
HVHVDV´a manipulation of powers of government or sale of government 
SURSHUW\RUERWKE\JRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVIRUSHUVRQDOXVHµ(Jain, 1998). 
In studying corruption, it is important to avoid asking whether corruption is 
inherently good or bad. Johnson pointed out that such questions are futile 
as the answer depends on the standards of a country and also on the ele-
ments of comparison (Johnson, in Ward, 1989: 17). The level of corrup-
WLRQZDVWKHQHYDOXDWHGDVWKHIUHTXHQF\RIXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWVE\ÀUPV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVIRUJDUQHULQJYDULRXVVHUYLFHVRURWKHUDGYDQWDJHV,Q
order to characterize and measure this variable, a set of seven questions 
was given to the respondents. For each question, the respondent had to 
indicate frequency using a 1-6 never/always scale (the same scale was 
XVHGIRUDOO WKHTXHVWLRQV $VDPSOHTXHVWLRQLV´+RZRIWHQGRÀUPV
OLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWVWRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWR
gain government contracts nowadays?” As mentioned earlier, exploratory 
IDFWRUDQDO\VLV()$DFURVVWKHVHYHQTXHVWLRQVLQGLFDWHGVXIÀFLHQWFRQ-
vergence to suggest that it was valid to incorporate all of them into one 
PHDVXUH&URQEDFKҋVњ 7KH()$LGHQWLÀHGRQO\RQHGLPHQVLRQ
for this variable. 
The same methodology was used for the other variables (see Table 3). 
For example, we evaluated the intensity of competition with a set of six 
TXHVWLRQV7KHGHJUHHRIFRPSHWLWLRQLQDQLQGXVWU\KLQJHVRQÀYHIRUFHV
the threat of new entrants, the bargaining power of customers, the bar-
gaining power of suppliers, the threat of substitute products or services 
(where applicable) and jockeying among current contestants (Porter, 
1979, 1980). Therefore, in order to measure the intensity of competition, 
a set of six statements was given to respondents, using a scale of 1-to-6 
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(1 for low and 6 for very high) to evaluate the pressure from competitors 
(this includes new entrants and current contestants, both local and for-
eign) and the pressure from customers in key strategic decisions, such 
DV´3OHDVHUDWHWKHLQÁXHQFHRIWKHSUHVVXUHIURPGRPHVWLFFRPSHWLWRUV
on key decisions about your business.” Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
DFURVVWKHVL[LWHPVLQGLFDWHGVXIÀFLHQWFRQYHUJHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDW LW
ZDVYDOLGWRLQFRUSRUDWHDOOVL[LWHPVLQWRRQHPHDVXUH&URQEDFKҋVњ 
7KH()$LGHQWLÀHGRQO\RQHGLPHQVLRQIRUWKLVYDULDEOH
To evaluate the quality of law enforcement, we used the quality of the 
SXEOLFVHUYLFHLQJHQHUDODVDSUR[\,WLVGLIÀFXOWWRDVVHVVWKHTXDOLW\RI
law enforcement if the respondent has never been involved in any legal 
action. Therefore, we assumed that the stronger the public services, the 
stronger the capacity of law enforcement. Each top manager was asked 
a set of questions, including ‘Could you please rate the overall quality 
DQGHIÀFLHQF\RI VHUYLFHVGHOLYHUHGE\ WKH MXGLFLDU\FRXUWV"ҋ 6HHAp-
pendix 1 for the questionnaire).
$QRWKHUVDPSOHFRQFHUQHGWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHTXDOLW\RIÀQDQFLDOPDU-
NHWV7KXVWKHKLJKHUWKHTXDOLW\RIDÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWWKHPRUHPRQH\
banks have to lend, making it easier to gain access to foreign banks, and 
easier to access non-bank equity investors. In turn, bank paperwork de-
creases, the bureaucracy gets a loan, and so the cycle continues. Our re-
spondents evaluated all the preceding elements. We used six questions 
WRDVVHVVWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVVXFKDV´&DQ\RXWHOOKRZ
problematic bank paperwork and bureaucracy is for the operations and 
JURZWKRI\RXULQVWLWXWLRQ"µ7KH()$LGHQWLÀHGDJDLQRQO\RQHGLPHQVLRQ
ZLWKD&URQEDFKҋVњ 4XHVWLRQVIRUDOOWKHYDULDEOHVDUHSURYLGHG
in Appendix 1.
Table 3: Description of variables. 
Construct Hypotheses Number of 
items
Mean S.D. Cronbach’s њ Rho of Dillon-Goldstein
Level of corruption 7 1.6284 1.0864 0.84 0.88
Intensity of competition H1 6  1.6323 0.82 0.87
Quality of the institutional 
framework 
H2 10  1.6361 0.81 
Quality of the legal frame-
work
H2a   1.3993 0.82 0.87
Law enforcement H2b 11  1.2618 0.83 0.87
4XDOLW\RIWKHÀQDQFLDO
market
H2c 6 3.8060 1.7626 0.77 
Unfair behaviour by com-
petitors
H3 9 3.4811 1.7839 0.86 0.89
Internationalization H4 1 7.3306 
Politicisation of economic 
activity
+ 7 1.8424  0.86 0.89
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Data Analysis
Our theoretical model was tested using a structural equation modelling tech-
QLTXHFDOOHG3DUWLDO/HDVW6TXDUHV3/6:ROG7KH3/6PHWKRGLV
oriented toward predictive applications and the explanation of variance as a 
UHJUHVVLRQLQZKLFK5DQGWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIUHODWLRQVKLSVDPRQJFRQVWUXFWV
(using Ordinary Least Squares, OLS techniques) indicate how well a model 
SHUIRUPV%DUFOD\+LJJLQV	7KRPSVRQ&RQFHSWXDOO\3/6LV´DQLW-
erative combination of principal components analysis relating measures to 
constructs, and a path analysis permitting the construction of a system of con-
VWUXFWVµ%DUFOD\HWDO7KH3/6DSSURDFKJHQHUDWHVHVWLPDWHVRI
VWDQGDUGL]HGUHJUHVVLRQFRHIÀFLHQWVLHSDWKFRHIÀFLHQWVZKLFKFDQWKHQEH
used to assess the relationships between latent variables. PLS also generates 
factor loadings of the items used, which are interpretable within the context of 
principal components analysis (Bookstein, 1986). PLS does not make assump-
tions about (1) data distributions to estimate model parameters, (2) observa-
WLRQLQGHSHQGHQFHRUYDULDEOHPHWULFV:ROG7KHVHXQUHVWULFWLYH
assumptions led us to select PLS over other structural modelling techniques 
VHH%DUFOD\HWDOIRUDGHWDLOHGH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH3/6WHFKQLTXH
   Table 4: Intercorrelations between the various variables. 
Variable
Politicisa-
tion of 
economic 
activity
Unfair 
behaviour 
by com-
petitors
Quality of 
the insti-
tutional 
frame-
work
Intensity 
of compe-
tition
Interna-
tionaliza-
tion
Impor-
tance of 
corrup-
tion
Law 
enforce-
ment
Qual-
ity of the 
ÀQDQFLDO
market
Quality of 
the legal 
frame-
work
Politicisation 
of economic 
activity
   1.0000  
Unfair be-
haviour by 
competitors
0.1046 1.0000
Quality of the 
institutional 
framework
-0.0498  1.0000
Intensity of 
competition 0.0237 0.2674 -0.1368 1.0000  
International-
ization -0.0224  0.0831 0.0722 1.0000 
 
Importance of 
corruption 0.0811 0.2189 -0.2378 0.1441 0.0481 1.0000
Law enforce-
ment -0.0166 -0.1283  0.0404 0.0013 -0.2429 1.0000
Quality of 
WKHÀQDQFLDO
market
 -0.3644 0.4671 -0.1826 0.0866 -0.2668 0.2192 1.0000
Quality of the 
legal frame-
work
0.0306  0.2816 -0.0116 0.0271 -0.1728 0.3869 0.1694 1.0000
   1 $OOFRUUHODWLRQVDUHVLJQLÀFDQWDW3
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Intercorrelations of all the variables used in this study are provided in 
Table 4. Partial support for our hypotheses can be seen in the cor-
relation matrix provided. The quality of business systems is positively 
FRUUHODWHG ZLWK ERWK WKH TXDOLW\ RI WKH OHJDO IUDPHZRUN U    
SWKHTXDOLW\RIODZHQIRUFHPHQWU SDQGWKH
TXDOLW\RIWKHÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVU S
As predicted, the intensity of competition also correlated positively 
ZLWKWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFRUUXSWLRQU S)XUWKHUPRUH
WKH LPSRUWDQFHRIFRUUXSWLRQZDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\DQGQHJDWLYHO\FRUUH-
ODWHGZLWKWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWU S
The level of corruption correlated positively with unfair behaviour by 
FRPSHWLWRUV U     S DQG WKH SROLWLFLVDWLRQ RI HFRQRPLF
activity also correlated positively with the level of corruption. All these 
correlations are in line with our theoretical model. However, surpris-
ingly and contrary to our prediction, the importance of the foreign 
stake in the local subsidiary correlated only slightly positively with the 
OHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQU S
Table 5 : Results of partial least squares analysis
Factor Correlation Contribution 
to R2
3DWKFRHIÀ-
cient
T student
Quality of institutional 
framework
R2 0.3013
H2a Quality of the legal 
framework
0.2816  0.1284 10.0481
H2b Quality of law 
enforcement
  0.2226 8.47469
H2c 4XDOLW\RIWKUÀQDQFLDO
market
0.4671 61.4790 0.3966 42.6308
Level of corruption R2 0.0882
H1 Intensity of the 
competition
0.1441 13.3829 0.0819 8.1917
H2 Quality of the 
institutional framework
-0.2378  -0.1786 -13.3092
H3 Unfair behaviour by 
competitors
0.2189  0.1186 7.3926
H4 internationalization 0.0481   
H5 Politicisation of 
economic activity
0.0811   
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The results of the PLS analysis used to test the hypotheses are sum-
marized in Table 5. The following results were obtained. Most of our 
K\SRWKHVHVZHUHVXSSRUWHGE\RXUHPSLULFDOGDWD2XUÀUVWK\SRWKHVLV
1 concerning competitive isomorphism is supported. We predicted that 
the higher the intensity of competition, the higher the potential for cor-
UXSWLRQ7KHSDWKFRHIÀFLHQWEHWZHHQWKHLQWHQVLW\RIFRPSHWLWLRQDQG
WKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQZDVSRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLÀFDQWћ S
The relationship between the quality of the business environment and 
WKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQZDVQHJDWLYHDQGVLJQLÀFDQWћ S
lending support to Hypothesis 2. Therefore, we support the coercive 
isomorphism hypothesis. The relationship between the quality of the 
business environment and the quality of the legal framework was posi-
WLYH DQG VLJQLÀFDQW ћ    S 7KH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH
quality of the business environment and the quality of law enforce-
PHQWZDVSRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLÀFDQWћ S7KHUHODWLRQVKLS
between the quality of the business environment and the quality of the 
ÀQDQFLDO PDUNHW ZDV DOVR SRVLWLYH DQG VLJQLÀFDQW ћ    S
These results support our hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c. The relation-
ship between the level of unfair behaviour by competitors and the level 
RIFRUUXSWLRQZDVSRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLÀFDQWћ S2XUGDWD
supports Hypothesis 3 concerning mimetic isomorphism. Furthermore, 
the relationship between the level of internationalisation and the level 
RIFRUUXSWLRQZDVRQO\VOLJKWO\SRVLWLYHћ SDQGWKHFRQWUL-
EXWLRQWR5òZDVYHU\OLPLWHGDW7KHUHIRUHZHPXVWUHMHFWK\-
pothesis H4 concerning normative isomorphism. Finally, we also have 
WRUHMHFWK\SRWKHVLV+FRQFHUQLQJWKHOLQNEHWZHHQWKHSROLWLFLVDWLRQ
of the economic activity and the level of corruption as our data shows 
DSRVLWLYHEXWPDUJLQDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHVHDVSHFWVћ 
SDQGDYHU\OLPLWHGFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH5òDW2XUPRGHOH[-
SODLQLQJWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQWLVVLJQLÀFDQWZLWKDQ
R² of 0.3109 (See Table 3). The combination of variables predicts 30% 
of the variance concerning the quality of the business environment. 
Overall, the basic model shown in Figure 1 and tested using PLS sup-
ports six of the hypotheses in this study with an R² of 0.08. 
Our model gives a stimulating explanation of corruption with respect 
to environmental and organizational factors. First, we predicted that 
an increase in competition in emerging countries is likely to lead to an 
increase in corrupt behaviour. We ascertained a positive relationship 
between the intensity of competition and the level of corruption. Com-
petitive isomorphism on the issue of corruption was supported by our 
empirical data. Our data shows that the higher the level of competition, 
the higher the level of corruption. This result can be explained by the 
IDFW WKDW LQ WKHÀUVWVWDJHRIHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWÀUPV LQHPHUJ-
ing countries facing greater competition may try to increase or secure 
market shares partially through the use of corruption. An increase in 
FRPSHWLWLRQOHDGVÀUPVLQHPHUJLQJFRXQWULHVWRSURWHFWUHQWVWKURXJK
corruption.
Second, the coercive isomorphism hypothesis was also supported by 
our data: i.e., the higher the quality of a business system, the lower 
WKH OHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQ ,QGHHGDVÀUPVDUHGHSHQGHQWRQ WKH UHJX-
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lative institutional environment, they adopt structures and behaviours 
accordingly. The quality of the business system (notably the quality of 
the legal framework, the quality of law enforcement and the quality of 
ÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVLQÁXHQFHVWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQLQÀUPVLQHPHUJLQJ
countries. 
Third, mimetic isomorphism explains the potential level of corruption. 
,IWKHFRPSHWLWRUVRIDÀUPKDYHKLJKOHYHOVRIXQIDLUSUDFWLFHDÀUPLV
more likely to adopt corrupt behaviour. This is in line with the theory of 
WKHUHIHUHQFHJURXSҋVLQÁXHQFHRQFRUUXSWLRQ5RVH$FNHUPDQ
namely that unfair endogenous behaviour exists between enterprises 
in the same economic sector.
Fourth, the normative isomorphism hypothesis was not supported. Our 
hypothesis was that the greater the stake of a multinational in a sub-
sidiary, the lower its use of corruption. Our empirical data showed no 
evidence of this. As a matter of fact, the correlation between the foreign 
ÀQDQFLDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHVXEVLGLDU\DQGFRUUXSWLRQZDVPDUJLQDODW
7KHHIIHFWRIPXOWLQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWVRQWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQ
LVQRWVLJQLÀFDQW)XUWKHUPRUHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH5òLVDOVRPDUJLQ-
DODWOHVVWKDQRIWKH5ò7KHVHUHVXOWVLPSO\LQGHSHQGHQFH
between both variables. Not all multinationals appear to consistently 
extend ethical behaviour to their subsidiaries. It is possible that if mul-
tinationals face risky investment environments and are confronted by 
high corruption in emerging countries, they may allow their subsidiaries 
to engage in corruption. Furthermore, even if a multinational owns a 
VLJQLÀFDQWVWDNHRIWKHFDSLWDOLQDORFDOÀUPLWGRHVQRWVWRSWKHORFDO
ÀUPIURPXVLQJFRUUXSWLRQ
Fifth, our theoretical development leads us to predict that the more 
SROLWLFLDQVDQGEXUHDXFUDWVH[HUFLVHFRQWUROULJKWVRYHUÀUPVWKHPRUH
likely organizations are to adopt corrupt behaviour. Despite the politi-
cisation of economic activity and the level corruption being positively 
correlated, this correlation is marginal with only a minor impact on the 
RYHUDOO5ò:HLGHQWLÀHG LQGHSHQGHQFHEHWZHHQERWKYDULDEOHV7KLV
could be explained by the fact that the politicisation of economic activ-
ity creates both corruption opportunities for bureaucrats and also the 
possibility to control organizations, implying a potential reduction in cor-
ruption. In emerging countries, if politicians and bureaucrats exercise 
FRQWURORYHUÀUPVWKLVPD\OHDGWRDKLJKHUOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQEXWRQO\
marginally higher. However, as our model suggests, a total economic 
free-for-all (i.e. no state economic intervention at all) will not lead to a 
decline in corruption. Government intervention is necessary to build a 
correct institutional framework and, in particular, to create an appropri-
ate legal framework and enforce the law. 
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CONCLUSION
Despite various major reforms led by top international bodies, cor-
ruption is still rampant in various emerging countries and this phe-
nomenon undermines their economic development. A weak institu-
tional framework is often described as key factor in the prevalence of 
corruption. Based on neo-institutional literature, our research aimed 
to show the influence of organizational isomorphism on corruption 
in emerging countries. This type of research is difficult because the 
central concept of corruption is hidden by nature. To explore the 
issue further, we used a direct data collection method through inter-
views with executives in emerging countries. A questionnaire was 
designed with various statements linked to a quantitative scale of 
answers. This allowed us to use a quantitative methodology to ana-
lyze the collected information. We opted for the PLS approach to 
test our theoretical model. The model developed provides an inte-
grated approach to the study of the relationship between corruption 
and organizational isomorphism. Our empirical data allowed us to 
test various theoretical hypotheses. 
We tested various key hypotheses concerning the influence of orga-
nizational isomorphism on corruption in firms in emerging countries. 
We showed that the quality of the institutional framework (law, law 
enforcement, quality of financial markets) has a negative impact 
RQWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQ7KHҊEHWWHUҋWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO
environment, the fewer the instances of corruption. 
Coercive isomorphism is a key factor in explaining various levels of 
corruption. There is a need for state intervention in order to build 
an appropriate business system (law, law enforcement, quality of 
financial markets). However, intervention should be limited and 
the state should allow private firms the freedom to make decisions 
within an adequate institutional framework. The greater the level of 
state intervention in the decisions of private firms, the more likely 
the bureaucrats will find opportunities to take bribes. 
Furthermore, mimetic isomorphism is a strong argument to explain 
the extent of corruption. Firms in emerging countries tend to imitate 
HDFKRWKHUҋVEHKDYLRXU$QHZHQWHUSULVHLQDQHPHUJLQJFRXQWU\LV
very likely to follow the corrupt behaviour of its successful competi-
tors, for example. 
Our empirical data also showed that the greater the level of compe-
tition, the greater the degree of corruption and thus firms in emerg-
ing countries facing an increase in corruption may try to secure 
rents by using unethical practices. 
The limitations of our study are largely related to our sample popu-
lation. Despite being conducted in many countries with 4104 inter-
views, this research relies on one-on-one interviews in each firm, 
in other words, only one executive was interviewed in each firm, on 
the assumption that one respondent could describe the phenom-
enon completely and accurately. This is nonetheless quite common 
in prior research in the field of corruption (Lancaster & Montinola, 
2001). 
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Our study shows that firms are influenced by the institutional en-
vironment in their decisions making regarding corrupt behaviour 
when dealing with governments. Since human capital that is uncor-
rupted is the engine of economic development (Wilhelm, 2002), it 
is important for emerging countries to find ways to reduce levels of 
corruption. Exploring the impact of corruption on economic devel-
opment through further studies should be considered a major field 
priority for economic decision-makers and researchers.
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire 
Concept : Level of corruption
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWRJHWFRQQHFWHGWRSXEOLFVHUYLFHVQRZDGD\V"
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWRJHWOLFHQFHVDQGSHUPLWVQRZDGD\V"
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWRGHDOZLWKWD[HVDQGWD[FROOHFWLRQQRZDGD\V"
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWRJDLQJRYHUQPHQWFRQWUDFWVQRZDGD\V"
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVZKHQGHDOLQJZLWKFXVWRPVLPSRUWVQRZDGD\V"
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVZKHQGHDOLQJZLWKFRXUWVQRZDGD\V"
+RZRIWHQGRÀUPVOLNH\RXUVQHHGWRPDNHH[WUDXQRIÀFLDOSD\PHQWV
WRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOVWRLQÁXHQFHWKHFRQWHQWRIQHZODZVGHFUHHVRUUHJX-
lations nowadays?
H1 Intensity of competition 
3OHDVHUDWHWKHLQÁXHQFHRIWKHSUHVVXUHIURPGRPHVWLFFRPSHWLWRUV
RQNH\GHFLVLRQVDERXW\RXUEXVLQHVVZLWKUHVSHFWWR´GHYHORSLQJQHZ
products and markets.”
3OHDVH UDWH WKH LQÁXHQFHRI WKHSUHVVXUH IURP IRUHLJQFRPSHWLWRUV
RQNH\GHFLVLRQVDERXW\RXUEXVLQHVVZLWKUHVSHFWWR´GHYHORSLQJQHZ
products and markets.”
3OHDVHUDWHWKHLQÁXHQFHRIWKHSUHVVXUHIURPFXVWRPHUVRQNH\GHFL-
VLRQVDERXW\RXUEXVLQHVVZLWK UHVSHFW WR ´GHYHORSLQJQHZSURGXFWV
and markets.”
3OHDVHUDWHWKHLQÁXHQFHRIWKHSUHVVXUHIURPGRPHVWLFFRPSHWLWRUV
RQ NH\ GHFLVLRQV DERXW \RXU EXVLQHVV ZLWK UHVSHFW WR ´UHGXFLQJ WKH
production costs of existing products.”
3OHDVHUDWHWKHLQÁXHQFHRIWKHSUHVVXUHIURPIRUHLJQFRPSHWLWRUVRQ
NH\GHFLVLRQVDERXW\RXUEXVLQHVVZLWKUHVSHFWWR´UHGXFLQJWKHSUR-
duction costs of existing products.”
3OHDVHUDWHWKHLQÁXHQFHRIWKHSUHVVXUHIURPFXVWRPHUVRQNH\GH-
FLVLRQVDERXW\RXUEXVLQHVVZLWKUHVSHFW WR´UHGXFLQJWKHSURGXFWLRQ
costs of existing products.”
H2 Quality of the institutional framework (1)
&DQ\RXWHOOPHKRZSUREOHPDWLFÀQDQFLQJLVIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQVDQG
growth of your business?
- Can you tell me how problematic infrastructures are (e.g. telephone, 
electricity, water, roads, land) for the operations and growth of your 
business?
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- Can you tell me how problematic taxes and regulations are for the 
operations and growth of your business?
- Can you tell me how problematic policy instability / uncertainty is for 
the operations and growth of your business?
&DQ\RX WHOOPHKRZSUREOHPDWLF LQÁDWLRQ LV IRU WKHRSHUDWLRQVDQG
growth of your business?
- Can you tell me how problematic exchange rates are for the opera-
tions and growth of your business?
- Can you tell me how problematic the functioning of the judiciary is for 
the operations and growth of your business?
- Can you tell me how problematic street crime, theft and public disor-
der are for the operations and growth of your business?
&DQ\RXWHOOPHKRZSUREOHPDWLFRUJDQL]HGFULPHDQGWKHPDÀDDUH
for the operations and growth of your business?
- Can you tell me how problematic anti-competitive practices by govern-
ment or private enterprises are?
H2a Quality of the legal framework 
7KLQNLQJDERXWRXUFRXQWU\ҋVOHJDOV\VWHPKRZRIWHQGR\RXDVVRFLDWH
WKHIROORZLQJGHVFULSWLRQV´)DLUDQGLPSDUWLDOµZLWKWKHFRXUWV\VWHPLQ
resolving business disputes?
7KLQNLQJDERXWRXUFRXQWU\ҋVOHJDOV\VWHPKRZRIWHQGR\RXDVVRFLDWH
WKHIROORZLQJGHVFULSWLRQV´KRQHVWXQFRUUXSWHGµZLWKWKHFRXUWV\VWHPLQ
resolving business disputes?
7KLQNLQJDERXWRXUFRXQWU\ҋVOHJDOV\VWHPKRZRIWHQGR\RXDVVRFL-
DWHWKHIROORZLQJGHVFULSWLRQV´4XLFNµZLWKWKHFRXUWV\VWHPLQUHVROYLQJ
business disputes?
7KLQNLQJDERXWRXUFRXQWU\ҋVOHJDOV\VWHPKRZRIWHQGR\RXDVVRFLDWH
WKHIROORZLQJGHVFULSWLRQV´$IIRUGDEOHµZLWKWKHFRXUWV\VWHPLQUHVROY-
ing business disputes?
7KLQNLQJDERXWRXUFRXQWU\ҋVOHJDOV\VWHPKRZRIWHQGR\RXDVVRFLDWH
WKHIROORZLQJGHVFULSWLRQV´&RQVLVWHQWUHOLDEOHµZLWKWKHFRXUWV\VWHPLQ
resolving business disputes?
H2b Law enforcement (evaluated by the quality of public 
service)
&RXOG\RXSOHDVH UDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the customs service?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVH UDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the judiciary / courts?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVH UDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the roads department?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVH UDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the postal agency?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVH UDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the telephone service?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVH UDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the electric power company?
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&RXOG\RXSOHDVHUDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the water/sewerage agency?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVHUDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the public health care service?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVHUDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the education services?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVHUDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the police?
&RXOG\RXSOHDVHUDWH WKHRYHUDOOTXDOLW\DQGHIÀFLHQF\RIVHUYLFHV
delivered by the armed forces/military?
H2c Quality of the financial market 
- Can you tell me how problematic bank paperwork and bureaucracy 
are for the operations and growth of your institution?
- Can you tell me how problematic high interest rates are for the opera-
tions and growth of your institution?
- Can you tell me how problematic the need for special connections 
ZLWKEDQNVDQGÀQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLVIRUWKHRSHUDWLRQVDQGJURZWKRI
your institution?
- Can you tell me how problematic the lack of access to long-term bank 
loans is for the operations and growth of your institution?
- Can you tell me how problematic the lack of access to Foreign banks 
is for the operations and growth of your institution?
- Can you tell me how problematic the lack of access to non bank eq-
uity/investors/partners is for the operations and growth of your institu-
tion?
H3 Unfair behaviour by competitors   
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"7KH\DYRLGVDOHVWD[RUWD[RQSURÀWV
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"7KH\GRQRWSD\GXWLHVRUREVHUYHWUDGH
regulations.
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUH IRU \RXU ÀUP")RUHLJQSURGXFHUVVHOO EHORZ LQWHUQD-
tional prices.
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"'RPHVWLFSURGXFHUVXQIDLUO\VHOOEHORZ
prices.
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"7KH\DYRLGODERXUWD[HVUHJXODWLRQV
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"7KH\YLRODWHP\FRS\ULJKWVSDWHQWVRU
trademarks.
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"7KH\FROOXGHWROLPLWP\DFFHVVWRFUHGLW
supplies, land, equipment or customers.
- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUH IRU \RXU ÀUP"7KH\ UHFHLYH VXEVLGLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH
toleration of tax arrears) from national / local government.
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- Can you tell me how serious a problem the following practices of your 
FRPSHWLWRUVDUHIRU\RXUÀUP"7KH\KDYHSUHIHUHQWLDODFFHVVWRFUHGLW
infrastructure services or customers.
H5 Politicisation of economic activity 
- How often does the government intervene in the investment decisions 
PDGHE\\RXUÀUP"
- How often does the government intervene in the employment deci-
VLRQVPDGHE\\RXUÀUP"
- How often does the government intervene in the sales decisions made 
E\\RXUÀUP"
- How often does the government intervene in the pricing decisions 
PDGHE\\RXUÀUP"
- How often does the government intervene in the merger/acquisitions 
GHFLVLRVPDGHE\\RXUÀUP"
- How often does the government intervene in the dividends decisions 
PDGHE\\RXUÀUP"
- How often does the government intervene in the wages decisions 
PDGHE\\RXUÀUP"
(1) To facilitate interpretation of the results we re-scaled the variable “Qual-
LW\RIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNµLQWKHIROORZLQJZD\UHVFDOHGDQVZHU 
– (original answer). Thus, a higher value corresponds to a higher quality of the 
institutional framework. 
